The Voting Paradox

are researchers in the area of voting security. Some have worked in this area for decades, others for years, and some are new to the area. But they all signed a letter about election security—right after the last presidential election. The body of the letter is also below.

Today I thought we might look into the main paradox surrounding voting security.

Peter G. Neumann and Rebecca Mercuri just published a paper in the CACM on voting security. It is titled The Risks of Election Believability (or Lack Thereof).

They say:

Trustworthiness in elections is inherently a total-system problem

So let’s look at election security.

The Paradox

The people who cast the votes don’t decide an election, the people who count the votes do—Joseph Stalin

I am reluctant in citing Stalin. But I believe that he hit the mark. The key in any election, in the US or elsewhere, is how and by whom the votes are counted.

The issue with the letter, with the recent paper, and more is that the researchers seem to be caught in the middle between two points of view:

• There is no evidence of voter fraud in the last presidential election. None. Zero.

• There is no proof of voting security in the last presidential election. None. Zero.

This is the problem. We would like to believe that voting is fair and secure. We would like to believe that our election—especially for president—is fair and correct. But we really have no proof that this is true. We are left with desire to make elections safer, but take the position that there is no issue with them.

Good luck.

The Letter

Here is the letter. I think they miss saying things as bluntly as Stalin does. But they do say essentially the same.

We are specialists in election security, having studied the security of voting machines, voting systems, and technology used for government elections for decades.

We and other scientists have warned for many years that there are security weaknesses in voting systems and have advocated that election systems be better secured against malicious attack. As the National Academies recently concluded, “There is no realistic mechanism to fully secure vote casting and tabulation computer systems from cyber threats.” However, notwithstanding these serious concerns, we have never claimed that technical vulnerabilities have actually been exploited to alter the outcome of any US election.

Anyone asserting that a US election was “rigged” is making an extraordinary claim, one that must be supported by persuasive and verifiable evidence. Merely citing the existence of technical flaws does not establish that an attack occurred, much less that it altered an election outcome. It is simply speculation.

The presence of security weaknesses in election infrastructure does not by itself tell us that any election has actually been compromised. Technical, physical, and procedural safeguards complicate the task of maliciously exploiting election systems, as does monitoring of likely adversaries by law enforcement and the intelligence community. Altering an election outcome involves more than simply the existence of a technical vulnerability.

We are aware of alarming assertions being made that the 2020 election was “rigged” by exploiting technical vulnerabilities. However, in every case of which we are aware, these claims either have been unsubstantiated or are technically incoherent. To our collective knowledge, no credible evidence has been put forth that supports a conclusion that the 2020 election outcome in any state has been altered through technical compromise.

That said, it is imperative that the US continue working to bolster the security of elections against sophisticated adversaries. At a minimum, all states should employ election security practices and mechanisms recommended by experts to increase assurance in election outcomes, such as post-election risk-limiting audits.

The letter is well written, but They say in the letter:

However, notwithstanding these serious concerns, we have never claimed that technical vulnerabilities have actually been exploited to alter the outcome of any US election.

This seems to be a problem. How do you get people to look both ways when crossing the street, when you have also basically asserted: “No one has ever been hit by a car when crossing the street.”

Open Problems

We believe that election security is a real issue. Perhaps our single point is: Even if we do not believe that any fraud happen in the past, we must agree to make the voting process secure. We must use all our insights to make elections not only fair, but believed to be fair.

Look both ways.

Ken notes that “Trust but verify” was first the Russian proverb Doveryay no proveryay, but that its origins are unclear even to Russians. He adds that besides how and by whom there is also the issue of when votes are counted. The warnings he gave in our election-eve post were reflected in claims made in the early December Texas attorney general filing.